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ABSTRACT 
DEVELOPMENT AND DETERMINANTS OF  
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  IN TURKEY:  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE EU COUNTRIES 
 
MURAT KARAEGE 
 
Master of Arts in European Studies,  
MA Thesis, 2006 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Bahri Yılmaz 
  
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, EU Integration, determinants of FDI, EU 
candidate countries 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of FDI inflows into the 
economy of Turkey, to analyze its development and various economic determinants, 
which govern its levels and performances. For this purpose, we have firstly to examine 
exact reasons for comparably low level of FDI in Turkey and secondly compare 
determinants of FDI in other EU Members & Candidates in order to discover essential 
steps to be taken. For this purpose, an FDI development analysis is made in the second 
chapter, and a comparative analysis between Turkey and EU Members & Candidates is 
completed in the third chapter. The research indicates that political and economic 
instability, weakness of legal framework, insufficient administration system, and 
corruption have been the major problems that prevent favorable investment climate, thus, 
attracting large amount of foreign direct investment. The lack of transparency in the 
financial statements and resistance to adopt the international accounting standards stand 
as the most important impediments in the microeconomic scope. The increasing FDI by 
2005 is considered to be closely linked with the European Union process of Turkey and  
the well functioning privatization program. 
 V 
ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE’DE DOĞRUDAN YABANCI YATIRIMIN GELİŞİMİ VE ETKENLERİ: 
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ÜLKELERİYLE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ 
 
MURAT KARAEGE 
 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans,  
Sanatta Yeterlilik Tezi, 2006 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Bahri Yılmaz 
 
  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırım (DYY), AB Entegrasyonu, DYS 
Etkenleri, AB adayları 
 
 
Bu tez Türkiye’de doğrudan yabancı yatırımın etkenlerini ve gelişmesini 
araştırmaktadır. Bu nedenle öncelikle Türkiye’deki yetersiz doğrudan yabancı 
sermayenin nedenleri üzerinde ikinci olarak da bu faktörlerin AB üye ve adaylarında 
yabancı sermaye etkenleriyle karşılaştırılması üzerinde durulmuştur. Karşılaştırmalı vaka 
araştırması bulgularına dayanarak yapılan analiz, Türkiye’de siyasi ve ekonomik 
istikrarsızlığın, yasal mevzuatın, idari prosedürlerin ve yolsuzluğun yabancı yatırımcılar 
için uygun bir yatırım ortamı yaratmaya yönelik önemli engeller olduğunu göstermiştir. 
Ayrıca, mali tablolardaki şeffaflık sorunu ve uluslararası muhasebe yönetmeliğininin 
uygulanmaması; şirketler bazında yabancı yatırımlar için önemli engel teşkil etmektedir. 
2005 yılı itibariyle Türkiye’de artan doğrudan yabancı sermaye Avrupa Birliği ile 
geliştirilen ilişkilere ve iyi işleyen özelleştirme programına bağlanmıştır.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (hereinafter FDI) has been the major vehicle for 
multinational enterprises in the last two decades to establish and expand business operations 
all over the world, particularly to the places that provide competitive advantages. On the other 
hand, foreign investment has contributed to economic development of emerging countries 
with its great input to their capital and technology level.                                                         
     The main purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of FDI inflows into the 
economy of Turkey, to analyze its development and various economic determinants, which 
govern its levels and performances. For this purpose, we have firstly to examine exact reasons 
for comparably low level of FDI in Turkey and secondly compare determinants of FDI in 
other EU Members & Candidates in order to discover essential steps to be taken. For this 
purpose, an FDI development analysis is made in the second chapter, and a comparative 
analysis between Turkey and EU Members & Candidates is completed in the third chapter by 
addressing the following questions:  
1- What are the economic determinants & impediments of FDI and how do they explain the 
developing foreign direct investment in Turkey? 
2- What does the comparative analysis with the EU Members & Candidates indicate for 
Turkey’s future performance in attracting sustainable Foreign Direct Investment?  
Finally, in the light of our results, we made some policy suggestions related with the FDI 
policy in Turkey.          
 In this study; Turkey is taken as a basis because Turkey failed to attract FDI between 
1980-2003 and is found to be successful in this area in the last two years due to betterment of 
investment conditions and starting of accession negotiations with the European Union. 
According to UNCTAD World Investment Report 2004, Turkey has been 35th in attracting 
FDI throughout the world; whereas she was ranked as 57th by 2003. Thus, Turkey has been 
successful to become aware and improve the negative features of its investment climate. This 
two dimensional nature puts Turkey in a unique position when analyzing impediments of FDI.  
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The research indicates that political and economic instability, weakness of legal 
framework, insufficient administration system, and corruption have been the major problems 
that prevent favorable investment climate, thus, attracting large amount of foreign direct 
investment. The lack of transparency in the financial statements and resistance to adopt the 
international accounting standards stand as the most important impediments in the 
microeconomic scope. The increasing FDI by 2005 is considered to be closely linked with the 
European Union process of Turkey and the well functioning privatization program. Thus, the 
ongoing negotiations with the European Union is found to be a helpful factor to eliminate 
traditional impediments by imposing regulations, therefore stabilizing and enhancing the 
investment environment. Comparative areas with the EU Members and Candidates will 
include key factors for the FDI inflow; such as purchasing power parity, labor costs, 
productivity, education, trade openness and demographic dynamism. The main aim of this 
kind of a research is to address the key areas that Turkey needs to develop in order to attract 
sustainable FDI inflow throughout the next decade.      
 The structure of the thesis is the following. The second chapter, namely, Development 
& Determinants of FDI in Turkey, gives insight into FDI inflows in Turkey starting from 
1980s. A detailed information on the nature of the Turkish economy, FDI inflow into different 
sectors, the source countries of FDI will be explored. The well known theories on Foreign 
Direct Investment such as Internalization, Eclectic Theory and Product Life Cycle Theory are 
going to be explained and linked with the Turkish case throughout the chapter. The 
determinants of FDI and the historic impediments will be analyzed in detail. Privatization and 
significant increase in the sales of state enterprises will be separately discussed as an 
important factor that contributes to the increasing FDI inflow in Turkey.  Moreover, practical 
examples from the corporate life are going to be provided in the context of impediments to 
FDI.             
  Chapter three, A Comparative Analysis of Turkey & EU Members & Candidates, 
presents an in depth comparison of Turkey and similar emerging economies of one or two 
decades ago, such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary and other comparable EU 
countries which have been successful in attracting foreign direct investment. The main aim of 
this kind of a comparison is to address the gap between Turkey and its competitors on key 
factors affecting the FDI inflow. Finally, the Conclusion chapter attempts to summarize the 
main findings of our case study and offers a recommendation section for Turkey to attract FDI 
throughout the accession negotiation process with the European Union. 
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CHAPTER 2 
          Development of Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey & Determinants of FDI 
 
If Turkey is to start a convergence process with the European Union by its new 
Economic Program launched in 2001, its growth rates will have to stay around 5–7 % range 
which is achieved in last couple of years. As Dervis puts it, the past experience shows that 
Turkey is lacking of domestic savings to finance investment to keep growth at this level 
(Stabilizing Stabilization, 2004). In fact, many EU members and candidates have faced with 
the problem of financing huge need of new capital which can not be obtained by domestic 
savings. Foreign direct investment here emerges as the best solution to finance the huge 
growth rates and current account deficit as this type of capital can not be typically pulled back 
at short term; and therefore, does not lead to potential for crisis. 
“For a country like Turkey, with a limited technology base and lack of domestic 
savings, FDI inflows are desirable” (Dervis, Stabilizing Stabilization, p.6).  After the 
economic liberalization program coming into force in 1980s, international trade became 
important part of the economy. This sudden improvement in the international trade can also 
be explained by the Customs Union Agreement with the European Union signed in 1996 
which implied an elimination of tariff and non tariff barriers on industrial goods and forced 
Turkey to adopt the Common External Tariff (CET) against third country imports.  However, 
integration with the world economy through FDI has been low compared to the other 
developing countries.  The Customs Union had a very limited impact on FDI inflow since 
1996. This could have resulted from the Turkish governments’ failure to facilitate the large 
interest shown by investors and to convert them into real investment because of many factors 
such as macroeconomic instability and ‘non-friendly’ FDI legislation (Hadjit -Browne, 2005). 
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2.1   Development of Foreign Direct Investment 
Although the legal framework preparations for the Foreign Direct Investment were 
already started in 1950s, the degree of openness of the Turkish economy has changed 
radically in the recent decades. According to the report of Melek Us (2001), the director of 
foreign investment department in Turkey, the cumulative FDI until 1980 was only USD 220 
million. The liberalization program adopted in 1980s aimed to minimize state intervention, 
establishing a free market economy and incorporating the Turkish economy with the global 
economy. Thus, with the liberalization program, Turkey has gradually abandoned the inward 
oriented strategy and accepted free market reforms, thus shifting into export oriented 
economic liberalization.  
As the below chart displays, the annual FDI flows in Turkey grew rapidly by the mid 
1980s, reaching $ 1 billion in 1990. However Us notes in the same report that the global FDI 
inflows has reached its peak on 1990s, USD 1 quadrillion in average. Thus, the increase of 
FDI inflow in Turkey at 1990s can be closely connected with the increase of global foreign 
investment.  
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       Source: Turkish Treasury, data as of  June 2003 
 
According to the above data, the FDI inflows were just 0.44 % of GDP in Turkey 
between 1995-2000. This statistic ranked Turkey on the 81st place out of 91 among 
developing and transition countries where FDI inflow was 2 % of GDP in average. Despite of 
emphasizing Turkey’s high FDI potential, Turkey has been ranked as an under performing 
country as it was the case with the World Investment Report in 2003. In the European 
Commission’s progress report in 2000, Turkey’s poor inward FDI performance was 
emphasized as a barrier to economic development and integration. Besides all these factors  
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the yearly FDI attraction potential of Turkey was US$ 35 billion according to the World 
Investment Report in 2002.  
 As shown in the above chart, in 1995, the year that the Customs Union agreement was 
signed and in 1996, where agreement came into force, approved and realized FDI flows show 
quite big differences. The main reason was that investors’ perceptions of the opportunities of 
investing in Turkey did not meet the reality of the situation. Therefore most of the authorized 
investment projects were not realized in 1990s (Loewendahl&Ertugal, 2001). In other words, 
the above chart indicates that the former governments were unable to facilitate the large 
interest shown by foreign investors. 
 After settling on USD 800  - 1,000 million range throughout the late 1990s, the FDI 
inflow has significantly increased as of 2004 and 2005. According to UNCTAD World 
Investment Report 2004, Turkey has been 35th in attracting FDI throughout the world with an 
FDI amount of $2,733 bn; whereas she was ranked as 57th by 2003 with an FDI amount of $ 
1,753 bn. Turkey showed improvement in 2004, but 2005 had been revolutionary. Even 
though the official numbers are not announced yet for the year ended 2005, it is predicted that 
the FDI amount has reached over $ 20 bn already (Erdikler, Foreign Investors’ Association 
Report, 2005). Even though the determinants of the increasing FDI will be analyzed later in 
the study we believe that the improving economy should be explored at this point  as being 
one of the most important determinants of FDI attraction. Today, Turkish economy performs 
better compared to last decade as the last stand-by agreement with the IMF and the 
regulations of EU Economic Criteria are carried out decisively into the economy. The main 
macroeconomic indicators provide confidence and stability. As of 2004, GDP grew by 9.9 % 
which makes Turkey OECD’s fastest growing country, leaving China behind. Debt to GNP 
ratio stands at 67 % at the year end 2005; which seems to be in line with the Maastricht 
Criteria, 60 %.  
The European Commission Report, European Economy (2004, p.100), states that 
stabilization of the economy has continued along 2003 and 2004 in Turkey. The main forces 
of the stabilization have been pointed as investment and private consumption. The inflation 
rate was below the target of 10 % achieved by strict fiscal policy and declining domestic 
demand. It is pointed by the European Union that Turkey has made progress in improving the 
functioning of markets and in strengthening the institutional framework for a fully functioning 
market economy. However, macroeconomic stability and predictability are not found 
sufficient yet to achieve sustainable growth rates throughout the next decade 
(http://europa.eu.int, 2005). 
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The last overview of the Turkish economy is stated as the following in the Seventh 
Review under the Stand-By Agreement by IMF: 
Successful macroeconomic management delivered an impressive economic 
performance in 2003. Fortunately, policy credibility that was established last 
year, as well as favourable political developments and positive global 
financial market conditions, shielded Turkey from adverse market reaction 
and gave time for fiscal, policy to be adjusted. The challenge of this final 
year of the program is to maintain macroeconomic policies firmly on track 
and to move decisively on a comprehensive program of structural reforms to 
safeguard and advance the recent achievements. (IMF, 2004) 
 
As it is shown in the figure below, the main source of FDI inflows in Turkey is the EU 
Members.  For the 1980–2002 period, France, Germany and the Netherlands were the chief 
investors in Turkey. They were followed by the United States, the UK and Italy. In terms of 
the number of companies, EU companies are yet again in the first position. As of June 2003, 
Germany is the leading country with 1,084 companies, followed by the Netherlands, UK and 
France (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004). However, the foreign interest from the non EU 
members has increased significantly as of 2005. Oger Telecom of Saudi Arabia bought 55% 
of Turk Telecom for $ 6.65 billion. The negotiations with the investors from Dubai are still 
ongoing. The project includes building of Dubai Towers in Istanbul worth $ 5 billion.  
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The distribution of FDI permits by sector indicates that between 1980 and 2002, the 
manufacturing sector attracted the most, with a share of 52.55 percent, followed by services 
(44.45 percent), agriculture (2.01 percent) and mining (0.99 percent) (Turkish Treasury, 
2005). In terms of sub-sectors, the automotive and auto-parts sub-sector are the ones that 
received most of the FDI permits. 
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2.1.1 FDI Theories & FDI in Turkey 
A number of theories have been developed to explain the models of the FDI and 
activities of multinational enterprises during the last couple of decades.  Well accepted, three 
of them are reviewed in this section briefly, with the purpose of providing appropriate 
knowledge over those known theories.  Furthermore, even though the literature lacks of 
matching the FDI theories and the pattern of FDI in Turkey, these theories are linked with the 
Turkish case with the aim of explaining the FDI inflow from certain industries. What we have 
found is that the theories themselves are not sufficient to enlighten the whole pattern FDI 
inflow in Turkey; however they are useful in bringing an explanation to some aspects of 
foreign direct investment.   
Theories discussed in the following pages are internalization theory, Dunning’s 
eclectic theory which seeks an explanation of multinational enterprises activities, and the  
product life cycle one which is originally known as a trade theory but also used to explain FDI 
and multinational enterprises’ activities too.  
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Internalization Theory 
The hypothesis of the internalization theory is that MNEs seek alternative ways to set up 
value-added activities outside the national market and those multinational enterprises take 
investment decision whenever they see that operating across national boundaries is beneficial 
and exceeds home market operation advantages (Dunning, 1993). 
Buckley&Casson (cited by Seymour, 1987, p 34) suggest that four main factors relevant 
to the internalization decision; 
 Industry specific factors, relating to the nature of the product and the structure of the 
external market 
 Region specific factors, relating to the geographical and social characteristics of the 
regions linked by market 
 Nation specific factors, relating to the political and fiscal relations between the nation 
concerned 
 Firm specific factors, which reflect the ability of the management to organize an 
internal market  
Griffin and Pustay (2002) contributes to the theorem that impediments and costs for 
transactions are the main factors in firms’ decisions to operate across national boundaries. By 
focusing non-transferable factors of competitive advantages, the internalization theory tries to 
explain why MNEs undertake FDI instead of choosing easier and less risky arrangements 
such as contracts or licensing. Firms are reluctant to transfer their assets to other firms which 
might be a competitor in the future by using knowledge of the contracting firm.   By setting 
their own operations in foreign markets, rather than licensing, firms are able to exploit their 
knowledge across borders while maintaining control and realizing a longer and safer return on 
investment (Rugman & Wr1ight, 1999).  
In today’s world, the companies that invest much more to the research and development 
are the ones that avoid giving licenses easily. So these companies internalize their operations 
abroad. In the Turkish example, the pharmaceutical companies that are coming from the 
developed countries are investing and establishing their production centers throughout the 
Turkey instead of giving their licenses to the local companies to produce ‘generic’ 
medicaments. Given the insufficient spending to the R&D and differences in the health 
regulations with the EU, the huge pharmaceutical companies such as GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer 
and Roche tend to build their own operations in Turkey in order to protect the reputation of 
their brand and to prevent misuse of its proprietary technology. Thus, in line with the 
internalization theory these companies do not leave the control to the local pharmaceutical 
firms.   
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Eclectic Theory 
The eclectic theory groups a number of explanations which can be classified either as 
ownership-specific advantages (O), location-specific advantages (L), and internalization 
advantages (I) (Harrison et al 2000). In deciding whether to undertake FDI, a firm must have 
developed firm specific characteristics that enable it to be competitive in the market. Dunning 
(1993) adds that the capability and willingness of MNEs to operate in foreign markets depend 
on their possessing specific assets. Such assets are referred as ownership specific advantages 
(O), because they are unique to that particular firm. Those assets are not only tangible such as 
natural endowments, capital etc. but also intangible assets such as technology, information 
and managerial skills. 
By location specific advantages (L), Dunning indicates the advantages that rise from 
using resource endowments or assets that are tied to a particular foreign location and that a 
firm finds valuable to combine with its own unique assets.  
The ‘I’ internalization factor in the OLI paradigm explains why a firm would choose 
to serve a foreign market through FDI rather than pursue alternatives modes without 
ownership of foreign equity (Oxelheim et al 2001). As mentioned in the internalization theory 
to establish the internal control is crucial for multinational companies to protect brand 
reputation (Griffin&Pustay, 2002). 
In the Turkish case, the foreign direct investment of global audit & corporate finance 
companies such as PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG can be explained by the eclectic 
theory. Managerial skills of these companies, such as its high level finance experts 
(ownership-specific advantages) stand as an important factor that shape their investment 
decisions. These companies recruit outstanding graduates throughout the world, therefore 
transferring know how between the different zones is not a huge issue for them. Turkey’s 
feature as an emerging economy, bridging between the EU and the Middle Eastern Countries 
determines the region of their investment (location specific advantages). As the ‘trust’ is the 
most important issue for the reputation of the audit firms, instead of giving the royalty rights 
to the local finance companies, these firms internalize their activities and run the enterprises 
by themselves (internalization factor).  
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Product Life Cycle Theory 
Product life cycle theory, which originated in the marketing field to describe the 
evolution of marketing strategies as a product matures, is a theory of international trade 
(Griffin&Pustay 2002). Despite this theory’s primary focus on international trade, the theory 
is also applied to explain FDI. Vernon argues that usually the same firms that pioneer a 
product in their home markets undertake FDI to manufacture a product for consumption in 
foreign markets (Hill, 2003). The theory of international product life cycle states that first, 
firms start by exporting their production to foreign markets then invest across national 
boundaries as product moves through its life cycle (Wild; 2003). This action contains three 
product stages; the new, maturing and the standardized. 
In the first stage, the product is not standardized. That is mainly because the 
innovation requires great research and development investment and qualified labor, and on the 
other hand demands for the product is unknown, the product would be first designed and 
manufactured in home market which is highly industrialized and provides sources for 
innovation. Thus, manufacturing costs are at the highest level due to non-standardized 
production and the continued use of highly skilled labor (Czinkota et al 1999). High 
production costs bring high prices for the product and it attracts mainly high income groups as 
customers (Tayeb, 2000). In this first stage of the product, the innovator company enjoys 
monopolistic advantages in the market. At the later stage of the cycle, the product is exported 
to the other markets, which show similarities in market structure and demand patterns, by 
having advantages of a combination of innovation and production facilities offered by home 
market (Dunning, 1993). 
When production expands, it becomes more standardized and this brings less need for 
highly skilled labor. As a result, production costs start to decline. At the same time, demand 
for the product from the other markets increases which enables the innovator company to 
invest in foreign markets (Harrison et al 2000). In this stage of the product, competitors come 
into the market with the same or similar products which put pressure on the prices and profit 
margins therefore the production costs become more important for the firms. Vernon (cited by 
Czinkota et al 1999) argues that the firm has to take a critical decision in this stage of the 
product. The first one is to lose market share against companies which have low-cost 
production facilities, and the second is to invest abroad where competitive advantages of 
factor costs exist. 
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In the last stage, the product is totally standardized. There are no needs for skilled 
labor and much research and development with the automation of the manufacturing process 
which forces the firms to manufacture where competitive advantage of factors’ is the highest 
(Czinkota et al 1999). 
This theory helps to explain why products once manufactured in developed countries, 
produced at lower cost in developing countries and then are exported back to the original 
producing countries (Harrison et al 2000). Product life cycle theory is applicable for 
technology based products. Other products such as resource based or services are not easy to 
categorize by stages of maturity (Czinkota et al 1999).  
 Through last decade, the automotive sector in Turkey has become a leading sector in 
the manufacturing industry. Moreover, it is one of the few sectors in which Turkey has 
become a global production location. From 16 automotive companies in Turkey which 
manufacture various vehicles from passenger cars, busses, pickups, mini and midi busses, 11 
businesses are foreign origin.   Three Asian companies Toyota, Hyundai and Honda received 
investment incentives from the Turkish governments and have established joint ventures with 
Turkish firms. The other EU based firms that invest in Turkey are Fiat (Joint Venture), Ford 
(Joint venture), MAN (Joint Venture) and Mercedes Benz (www.deik.org.tr). Capital 
partnerships between Tofas- Fiat, Oyak – Renault, Ford – Otosan, Toyota and the recent 
capital increases in their Turkish plants reveals the full integration of Turkey into the strategic 
market expansion plans for foreign firms. In our opinion, this progress in the automotive 
sector can be explained by the product life cycle theory. The countries that started car 
production have realized the competitive advantages in the emerging economies such as 
Turkey. Thus, the production process has shifted to Turkey and the other developing countries   
with relatively low production costs in order to generate high profits. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
 
2.1.2 Turkey & Key Location Factors of Host Country 
MNEs assess many factors before they take investment decision in a particular 
country. Investment decisions are determined after analyzing many factors that would affect 
the business. UNCTAD Trade and Development Board’s report points that three factors are 
important to determine where the MNE invest: the policies of host countries (including the 
core regulatory framework for FDI), the proactive measures countries adopt to promote and 
facilitate investment, and the characteristics of their economies (UNCTAD 1999).  
Throughout the last couple of decades, with globalization and especially the changing 
attitudes of former communist countries to achieve market economy, developing countries are  
in competition to attract more FDI inflows by setting attractive policies for the world’s 
biggest MNEs (Hill, 2003). However, government policies still might be both promoting and 
restricting. Some governments set up attractive policies to have more FDI inflows into 
country with the purpose of finding sources to boost the economy, whereas other governments 
put some controls on FDI inflows with the intent of protecting domestic industries, firms or 
national sovereignty and autonomy.  FDI policies of host countries are also related to trade, 
privatization, macro economics and competition policies (UNCTAD, 1999). 
UNCTAD’s (2003) report stresses that business facilitation measures include 
investment promotions, after investment services, incentives and improvements in amenities. 
Fiscal and financial incentives are also attractive for MNEs even though they are considered 
later than the other determinants settled.  
According to the UNCTAD investment reports, economic factors assert themselves as 
location determinants. They are shown as principal motives for investing abroad and named 
as: resource seeking, efficiency seeking, asset seeking and market seeking.  
Resource Seekers  
MNEs can have opportunities by investing abroad to acquire particular and specific 
resources at a lower cost. This penetration aims to be more profitable and competitive in the 
markets by using these cheap or efficient resources. Most output of affiliates is exported 
mainly to the developed countries. Dunning (1993) classifies resource seekers into three parts 
as explained below. 
The first kind of resource seeking is for physical resources. Producers and 
manufacturing enterprises undertake FDI in order to minimize cost and to secure supply 
sources. MNEs, especially whose products need complimentary inputs, try to reach resources 
such as minerals, raw materials and agricultural products. For industries such as mining and 
petroleum, access to resources is crucial (Harrison et al 2000).  
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The second kind of resource that companies may see as an opportunity is cheap and 
skilled labor (Czinkota et al 1999). MNEs seek investment opportunities in countries with low 
labor cost and skilled or semi-skilled labor potential by setting up or acquiring subsidiaries 
with the purpose of low production cost. The third type of resource seeking FDI is to acquire 
technology, management or marketing know-how and organizational skills. Companies from 
developing countries such as Asian MNEs particularly try to form alliances with developed 
countries’ firms in order to obtain know-how (Dunning, 1993). The analysis in section 3.2 
shows that the labor costs in Turkey are much higher than that of Central Eastern and 
European Countries. Nevertheless, Turkey overwhelms in labor productivity rankings which 
is a positive indicator for foreign investors.   
Efficiency Seekers (Vertical Multinationals) 
Having benefits of economies of scale and scope and with the purpose of risk 
diversification, existing market seeking or resource seeking investments may be governed 
together to gain optimum efficiency from the investment. The purpose of efficiency seeking 
is, in brief, to use different factor endowments and market structures with common or similar 
production facilities in few locations and to supply to multiple markets.  However, the firm 
must be producing standardized products and involved in globally accepted production 
processes. Dunning (1993) classifies efficiency seeking FDI as two kinds; the first uses 
advantages of availability and cost of factor endowments in different countries. The optimum 
efficiency can be reached by investing capital, technology and information intensive activities 
in developed countries and investing labor and natural resources intensive activities in 
developing countries. The second kind is made in similar economic structures and income 
levels and is designed to take advantages of the economies of scale and scope (Dunning 
1993). 
Hadjit and Browne (2005) define Turkey as a suitable location for efficiency seeking 
FDI. The argument is supported by the example of EU–Turkey Customs Union, which is a 
crucial sign for efficiency-seeking FDI. For the Asian or Middle Eastern firms which want to 
access the European market, Turkey might become an export base to the rest of the EU. 
Bevan and Estrin (2000) have found that the prospect of future EU membership of candidate 
countries made them more attractive for efficiency-seeking FDI because of the establishment 
of regional corporate networks.  
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The strategic assets or capability seekers 
Dunning (1993) notes that MNEs seek to build strategic assets such as new technology 
or distribution networks by investing in other companies abroad that specialize in certain 
aspects of production. This occurs when a company collaborates with another one to prevent 
competitor’s operation, merges with one of its foreign rivals to strengthen their joint 
capabilities, acquires a group of suppliers to get the market for a certain raw material, seek 
access over distribution outlets, acquire a firm that produces a complementary range of goods 
or services, join forces with a local company that is in a better position to secure contracts 
from the host government. Companies look for these opportunities to protect themselves or to 
build a better position in the market. The expected benefits might include gaining access to 
new markets via the foreign party involved (distribution networks and/or government 
contracts), creating synergies and economies in R&D, production and marketing, or acquiring 
a range of tangible or intangible assets through the acquisition of a foreign company that 
compliments the MNE’s current offerings. 
The tobacco market in Turkey is huge and maintains big potential for foreign 
investors. As of 2003, Philip Morris International (PMI), who had a 39% market share 
announced that it was interested in the acquisition of TEKEL, the Turkish State Liquor and 
Tobacco Monopoly, which had 35 % market share. In spite of this fact, TEKEL was standing 
as a strategic opportunity for PMI to grow further in the market. The Competition Authority 
(CA) declared that PMI’s acquisition of TEKEL may bring future liability to the company as 
this would mean an establishment of a clear monopoly in the market and could pave way to 
abuse of the leading position. To prevent this situation, CA recommended TEKEL to avoid 
‘block sales’ and proposed TEKEL to get divided into 4 companies before going to the 
auction process. Thus, CA prevented PMI to buy TEKEL as a block, so the Company did not 
bid through the privatization process. This example gives an insight on the attitude of the 
foreign investors to acquire strategic assets in Turkey and also summarizes the approach of 
Turkish superior authorities against unfair competition emerging through foreign direct 
investment.  
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Market Seekers (Horizontal Multinationals) 
So far, national market size and the population income have been important 
determinants for FDI. MNEs invest into foreign markets to find new customers for their goods 
and services. If the managers notice that their product is unique and can dominate the new 
market then they may seek to take advantages of this opportunity. Dunning (1993) states that 
apart from market size and growth potential, there are four main reasons about why 
companies take market-seeking investments decisions. The first one is following suppliers or 
customers. The second reason is to adapt to local tastes (both the product itself and business 
operation) which would prevent weaknesses against local companies’ products. The other 
reason emerges when serving a local market from adjacent facilities is cheaper than supplying 
from distance. It is for sure that manufacturing goods which do not need specific production 
facilities and which are expensive to transport should be produced in or around the targeted 
market. The last, but not the least, reason pointed by Dunning (1993) is to have a physical 
presence in the leading markets served by its competitors. This type of investment is mostly 
made by large sized MNEs that operate in the oligopoly sectors such as oil and semi-
conductors. At this point it should be noted that, the purchasing power of the people is the real 
determinant in a huge market. As it will be discussed in Section 3.1, despite of its huge 
population, Turkey has to take decisive steps to enhance its purchasing power parity 
compared to EU Members.  
 
 
    2.2 Determinants of FDI in Turkey 
 
This section discusses the main determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey 
and throughout the world. According to an in depth research conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002) the main determinants of foreign direct investment can be 
summarized under economic determinants, FDI enabling environment and political and 
institutional determinants. The economic determinants include economic liberalism (tariff and 
non tariff barriers, privatization policies, foreign exchange policy, taxation), performance of 
the economy (GDP growth, inflation, internal and external debt), FDI track record and the 
telecommunications infrastructure. FDI enabling environment indicates investment 
promotion, investment facilitation, incentives, corruption and administration costs and post-
deal services. Political and institutional determinants include political system, government’s  
attitude to the foreign direct investment, tensions among socio-economic groups, judicial 
system and dispute settlement, rules of entry and operation, policies of functioning and  
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structure of markets (competition policy, mergers & acquisitions, labor markets), international 
agreements on FDI, coherence of FDI and trade policies, cultural factors and quality of life 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002, Doing Business in Turkey).  
Through this section we will start by discussing the performance of the Turkish 
economy, as it emerges as the most important economic impediment to FDI. The other 
significant determinants that will be discussed are; the political stability, corruption, 
administration procedures, legal framework and tax system. In fact, the increasing FDI in 
Turkey as of 2004 and 2005 are linked to the betterment of these impediments that are 
described at the end of each subsection. OECD Economic Survey (2002) on Turkey supports 
the findings of this research, as the survey stresses that chronic macroeconomic instability, a 
fragmented political system, a cumbersome bureaucracy and legal environment for businesses 
combine to make Turkey as an unattractive place for foreign investors compared to other 
countries at similar development levels. In the same survey, FDI potential of Turkey is linked 
with EU candidacy or membership and the increasing privatization process. Throughout the 
third chapter, the key factors that have crucial impact of the FDI inflow in Turkey are going to 
be compared with that of EU countries.  
 
2.2.1 Turkish Economy & Economic Impediments to FDI 
The Turkish economy has long been suffering from an exceptional degree of 
macroeconomic instability characterized by especially hyperinflation and sharp swings in the 
business climate. Turkey experienced serious economic crises throughout the last decade that 
resulted with IMF oriented stabilization programs. The underlying reasons for the crisis were 
hided over the previous decade, particularly a fragile banking system, weakness in the 
structural fiscal adjustment as well as, the external crisis that directly affected Turkish 
economy (OECD, 2002). Moreover, up until 2003, Turkey was one of the several major 
economies in the world that continued to struggle with a high inflation rate.  
The World Bank Report states that “macroeconomic instability has played an 
important role, among many factors, in Turkey's inability to realize its full growth potential. 
Cross-country comparisons and analytical work suggest that countries that grew faster than 
Turkey did so in part because they achieved a greater degree of macroeconomic stability, 
accumulated physical capital  faster,  invested  more  in  human  capital,  and  did more  to  
improve  government effectiveness and the business climate” (World Bank, 2003, p.16). The 
macroeconomic and structural policy challenges which Turkey experienced in the last decade 
include a substantial public debt burden, high inflation, banking sector difficulties, and 
extensive state involvement in the economy.  
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The key problem triggering the economic instabilization has been the public sector 
debt, which rose from 25 % in 1990s to the 90 % as of 2001. The collapse of exchange rate 
and surge in the public sector debt by recapitalizing the de facto bankrupt state banks in 2001 
have led to increase of public debt / GDP ratio. The new economic program adopted after the 
crisis in 2001 was based on radical fiscal retrenchment to pull down public debt. Thus, the 
fluctuations in annual growth rates in the last two decades have improved in last couple of 
years by these tight fiscal policies. Average growth rate between 1983 and 1993 has been 5.0  
% whereas it was 2.7 % in the period between 1993 and 2003 (www.worldbank.org, 2005). 
This rate is not low compared to OECD countries’ average growth rate which was c.a 2.1% in 
1992-1997 and 2.7 % in 1997-2002. However, the growth rates have been negative in the 
periods of financial crises. To give an example, GDP growth rate was 2.8 % in average 
between 1992-1997 whereas it was negative (-0.6%) between 1997 and 2002  (www.oecd.org 
2003). As of Turkey and EU set out the beginning of accession negotiations in 2005, the 
foundations exist for continued stable and rapid growth. Therefore, fiscal policy now 
generates a sizeable primary surplus which stands at 6.5 % as of 2004, structural reforms pave 
way to decrease in government expenditures and social policies ensure that inequalities do not 
undermine the social cohesion (Dervis, 2004). Finally the growth rate, which is one of the 
most important determinants for FDI inflow, is increased to 9.9 % in 2004, and over 5 % in 
2005.  
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The inner structure of the economy had been another important reason for the failure 
of attempts to stabilize the economy throughout the last decade. State involvement has always 
been at high levels and state-owned enterprises often enjoyed monopoly status in strategic  
sectors such as telecommunications. As the result of the populist policies, the public sector 
employed excessive workers with low productivity and thus, affording high wage costs.  
As mentioned above, over the last decade, Turkey experienced several financial crises. 
By the end of 1993, increasing current account deficit and debt resulted with governments 
changing policies towards a low interest rate with high depreciation. The first exchange rate 
decline was 13 % which destroyed the banks’ balance sheets. In April, devaluation of Turkish  
Lira was around 65 percent; which resulted with foreign capital flow-out. The interest rates 
jumped up overnight and the economy has faced with a massive recession (OECD, 2002).  
Following the 1994 crisis, with the effects of the Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian 
crisis in 1998, the economy again experienced a deep recession and high interest rates which 
prompted the government to agree on another Stand-By with IMF in 1999. On 20 February 
2001, a political problem between the Prime Minister and the President, just before a major 
Treasury auction, has triggered the deepest financial crisis of Turkey. Overnight rates jumped 
to unprecedented levels of 6200%, the Turkish Lira depreciated 40% in ten days and the 
Central Bank reserves lost 5.36 billion USD in a week (Uygur, 2001). 
The fragile banking system has been the breaking point, especially at the time that the 
economy was hit by crises. The weak banking system led the economic program, supported 
by the IMF stand-by agreement, to end up with twin crises, which resulted in a credit crunch 
and severe decline in the banking sector in 2001. As Dervis explains (2004), what led to the 
2001 crisis was the coming together of a banking crisis, which forced the state to recognize its 
contingent liabilities in the banking sector, with a risky attempt to disinflate by using a 
nominal anchor exchange rate policy.  The problems in the banking sector arouse from small 
and fragmented banking structure, dominance of state banks in total banking sector, weak 
asset quality, extreme exposure and fragility towards market risk, lack of transparency, 
inadequate internal control systems, risk management and corporate governance. In response 
to the severe banking crises, the government has taken a number of serious reform actions 
supported by the World Bank and the IMF. A number of insolvent private banks were taken 
over, recapitalized, restructured or sold. The public banks have been restructured and some of 
them are put into privatization portfolio. The cost of the clean up has been huge for Turkish 
economy, it was accounted around 30% of the GDP.  
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Since the calendar with the EU negotiations is announced by the European 
Commission on December 17, 2004, the banking sector recovers; thanks to the increasing FDI 
inflow into the financial services. Fortis Bank of Belgium acquired 89.34% of Disbank shares  
for $1.14 billion. Another important transaction during 2004 was the acquisition of the 
indirect ownership of the financial holding company of Turk Ekonomi Bankasi (TEB), TEB 
Mali Yatirimlar, by BNP Paribas for $217 million. Currently, Deutsche Bank is negotiating 
with Finansbank for a potential acquisition. Thus, the increasing confidence on the relations 
between EU – Turkey and recent banking regulations put into force has encouraged foreign 
investors to invest at Turkish banking sector.  
As it is the case with Turkey, chronic inflation had been the main difficulty for the 
other developing countries throughout the transition period. Throughout 1990s; the inflation 
averaged about 70 % and until 2003, Turkey has remained as the only major economy that 
suffered from inflation. As of 2004, Turkey has succeeded to pull the rates down to 12 %, and 
the inflation rates decreased below to 8 % as of December 31, 2005.  
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More than a decade, instable economy and high inflation rates have led to high interest 
rates and weakness of the Turkish Lira. The consequent devaluation has resulted with Lira 
becoming one of the worthless currencies in the global economy. The below graph indicates 
the depreciation of Turkish Lira against US Dollar. As of January 1, 2005, six zeroes were 
deleted from Turkish currency and New Turkish Lira became the new currency unit. The 
main purpose of removing zeros was eliminating the operational and technical problems 
arising from the use of figures with multiple zeros. However this operation has coupled with  
the success of driving inflation down to single digit numbers. Thus, the new Turkish Lira 
became a symbol of Turkey’s determination to drive down the inflation and attain price 
stability.   
Exchange Rates 
419.542
626.486
1.228.837
1.511.055 1.502.995
1.454.315
0
200.000
400.000
600.000
800.000
1.000.000
1.200.000
1.400.000
1.600.000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
TL/USD Rate
 
                    Source: Turkish Treasury 2004 
 
 29 
 
High inflation rates led to a sharp rise in interest rates which created a serious obstacle 
for foreign and domestic investors. It became more profitable for investors to place their 
money towards guaranteed high yields without risk rather than entering into the more 
unpredictable environment of the market (Turan, 2002). Currently the nominal interest rates 
in Turkey stand around 14 % which is well above the Maastricht Criteria and the EU Average, 
which is 3.5 %.  
World Bank has emphasised the importance of the government programs in fighting 
against economic weakness and noted that; 
 Countries that introduced economic reforms in general and in particular geared 
toward FDI such as Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Thailand, witnessed sustained 
increases in FDI inflows in the post-crisis period. The FDI plays a strategic role 
beyond recovery from crisis. Competition pressures from foreign firms can 
promote product innovation, the overall diffusion of new technology, 
investment in new plants and sales growth. Increased FDI can play a crucial 
role in broader corporate restructuring through exposure to advanced 
organizational and managerial skills. (World Bank, 2003) 
 
Stability in the economy is one of the first factors that foreign investors assess before 
taking investment decisions. Instability discourages investors as uncertainties in the future 
put the investment in a more risky position. Research conducted by TUSIAD&YASED 
(2004) points Turkey as in the 13th position among 16 emerging economies in terms of 
providing stable general macroeconomic conditions.  
The above description on economic instability might explain why Turkey lagged 
behind the other emerging markets in terms of attracting FDI inflows. However, as it is 
explained above, the recovery of Turkish economy has already started. On December 14, 
2004, the IMF and Turkey signed a new agreement worth $10 billion for three years starting 
from 2005. The official start of accession negotiations with the EU on October 3, 2005 brings 
much more confidence. For the year 2006, the Central Bank of Turkey targets 4.7 % inflation 
rate. In fact when CPI target is analyzed for last couple of years, we can not criticize Central 
Bank as being optimistic. The Central Bank fixed a target of end-year CPI (Consumer Price 
Index) 12 percent in 2004 and 9 percent in 2005. Turkey reached the target for 2003 and 2004 
as the end-year CPI was respectively for those years 18.4 and 9.32 percent. Thus, Turkey 
showed it was catching up with Bulgaria and Romania, where the inflation rate was 6 and 9.3 
percent in 2004. Low inflation that is achieved in last couple of years brings certainty 
concerning the possible scenarios of the economy's future and imparts confidence in the  
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ability of foreign investors to repatriate earnings. However Turkey now is encouraged to 
maintain a stability-oriented economic policy in order to convert the current positive 
dynamics into sustained economic development (Hadjit-Browne, 2005). The below figure 
summarizes the macroeconomic policy achievements since 2001, the launch of new economic 
program. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Political Stability 
Foreign direct investment is an activity based on future prospects of the return of 
investment and the confidence in the host country that should be foreseeable for investors. A 
common strategy that foreign investors adapt to their investment is the minimization of the 
risk regarding their return on investment. Thus, political stability is an important part of the 
investment decision process which secures the future of the operation from the risks, caused 
by political problems in the host country. 
The survey (K.Chan & E.Gemayel, 2004) shows that over 50 % senior executives of 
the large MNEs believe that government regulations, political and social disturbance, 
currency and financial risks are the major risks that bear on their investment decision.  The 
survey concludes that these politic, economic and financial risks have more impact on 
investment decision compared to other factors such as intellectual property rights, safety 
problem and security threats. While political stability is one of the important factors to offer 
an attractive investment climate with its effect on both economic and social issues, it has been 
one of the major obstacles for Turkey in having FDI flows. 
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Very often change of governments throughout the last decade has caused political 
uncertainties in Turkey. In the last 13 years, Turkey had experienced 13 governments 
(www.tbmm.gov.tr, 2005). The rapid change of the governments may be the similar problem 
in the other developing countries; however, in Turkey; each change of government has 
applied significant modifications in the personnel structure and brought different attitudes 
within the state mechanism. From the eye of investors, Turkey is considered to have a highly 
volatile political and economic system prone to sudden policy changes (DEIK, 2001). 
Continual formations of coalition governments through 1990’s have been major reason 
for political instability. Weak governments were incapable to take courageous decisions and 
policies and even less capable of implementing the decisions taken. The populist policies of 
coalitions ended up with short term cabinets and large public debts with excessive public 
expenditures. 
The tradition of each government assigning their own bureaucrats to the different 
levels of administrative organs had created fear for existing bureaucrats to lose their positions 
which paved way to bureaucratic inefficiency. Starting in the 1970s, large sections of the 
bureaucracy became politicized. This cycle created an administration system that had been 
dealing with personal issues and interests instead of formulating and carrying out major 
policies. Thus, policies made in these periods were devised in an inappropriate way without 
judging needs or measuring potential outcomes. This might be shown as a main reason that 
policies and business environment became very unpredictable (Turan, 2002). 
Political instability triggers other impediments to create favourable business 
environment. The economic restructuring programs, eliminating corruption and insufficient  
bureaucracy can succeed only if the political environment is stable and decisive in 
application; and only if politicians execute the necessary reforms and policies.  
Similar to its economy, Turkey’s political landscape has improved in last several 
years. With the adoption of many reforms in line with EU’s Copenhagen Criteria; there has 
been considerable improvement in human rights and independence of judicial system. The 
prospect of future membership offers foreign investors a guarantee of democratization in 
Turkey. Through the increasing FDI in the last two years, the argument of today’s 
government has become that EU membership would anchor Turkey in the West, strengthen it 
as a firewall against terrorism, and help make it a model of democracy for the Muslim world 
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2.2.3 Administrative Procedures 
Administrative procedures might be another discouraging factor for investors if the 
procedures are cumbersome, time consuming, and expensive. If the other conditions are the 
same; easy and cheap operation process could be a main determinant of investment decision. 
Excessive regulations can lead to substantial delays and costs to firms that may decide to 
locate elsewhere.  Morisset & Neso (2002) state that administrative procedures which vary 
from country to country depend on the structural factors such as political system, transparency 
in the government and economy, the corruption level, the legal system and the public sector 
wage policy.  
In evaluating the performance of Turkey in terms of attracting FDI inflows, the cost 
and the time of administrative procedures were observed as the longest process compared to 
the other EU countries, including less developed ones. The main problem was the lack of 
entity that manages all necessary procedures regarding foreign investors. There have been so 
many procedures for investors to apply and deal with; such as registration papers, required 
approval and work permits. Not only the starting point but also during the operations, such 
detailed procedures have been burdensome for foreign investors as well as domestic investors.  
The study (Morisset&Neso, 2002) conducted among 32 developing and less developed 
countries proves the failure of Turkey in providing a pleasant investment climate in terms of 
administrative procedures. The study provides the figures from 2001 and it assumes a 
standardized firm with the following main characteristics; it performs general industrial or 
commercial activities, it operates in the largest city by population, it is exempt from industry-
specific requirements, it does participate in foreign trade, it employs expatriates and a total of 
20-50 employees, it purchases or leases state land, it is connected to 10 phone lines and uses 
on average 100 kW of electricity during peak hours, and it is a limited liability company with 
a initial capital of US$10,000. 
The procedure is divided into three parts as the first group is entry approvals, the 
second is access to land, site development and utility connections; and the last one is 
considered operational requirements. Results proved that the number of procedures in the 
second category is the highest one in Turkey as 125 procedures are required to access land, 
site development and utilities. In terms of entry approvals procedures, Turkey ranked the 
second after Bulgaria with 22 procedures before the start of the operation.  
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The longest delay is also found in Turkey with 1,106 business days -121 days for entry 
and 985 days for the second category- to complete the whole process. The most important 
delays arise from land purchasing from the state and site development procedures, especially  
permits and inspections from local authorities that appears relatively inefficient in processing 
investors' requests. The administrative cost for foreign investors in Turkey has also proved to 
be one of the highest among 32 countries that are examined in the study.   
An important attempt for betterment of the long administrative procedures has been 
the new FDI law enacted in 2003.  By this new law, international standards and rights of 
investors are improved by guarantee of transfers, access to real estate, international arbitration 
and employment of expatriates. Besides this new law, government has established 
Coordination Committee for the Improvement of Investment Climate (YOIKK) in 2004. This 
body was formed to remove administrative and regulatory barriers for foreign investors. The 
objective of this Law, stated by Turkish Treasury, is; 
to encourage foreign direct investments; to protect the rights of foreign 
investors; to define investment and investor in line with international standards; 
to establish a notification-based system for foreign direct investments rather 
than screening and approval; and thus regulate the principles to increase foreign 
direct investments through established policies.(http://www.treasury.gov.tr, 
2003) 
 
However, Turkey is having difficulties to implement the rules. The most recent 
example to administrative procedures can be given from Hyundai investment. In 2004, 
Hyundai top management has declared that they would like to invest and build factory in 
Turkey and employ 3,000 people (which exceeds 20,000 employers with the emergence of 
supplier industries). However as the authorities delayed the allocation of building plot for 
Hyundai, the management decided to invest in the Czech Republic which offered high 
incentives such as investment tax credit and free land. 
A necessary pre condition to remove administrative barriers is that social goals for 
foreign direct investment should be clearly defined and widely shared by society. This would 
increase the probability that discretion is used in a way that enhances social welfare and that 
deviant behavior becomes socially unacceptable. Only then it will be possible to rely on the 
discretion of politicians and public sector employees. More recent research conducted by 
ACIEP (The Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy, 2003) presents 13 
procedures were required to start a business in Turkey, taking 53 days and costing US $1,222.  
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A number of formalities that must be followed in starting process of the business are 
illustrated below.  
 
 
 
                            Source: http://www.solidine.com, 2005 
 
As shown in the chart, foreign investors have to deal with a number of different bodies 
that pave way to delays and the costs. The inefficiency of state institutions and the corruption 
in different levels of the government organs increase the loss of time and other informal costs. 
This control, combined with lack of accountability and transparency, paves way to a 
widespread corruption (Fias 2001, cited by Erdilek 2003). Thus, in our opinion, there exists a 
close linkage between administrative procedures and corruption. As the procedures become 
more complicated and lengthy, the tendency for corruption increases. The next section deals 
with the nature of corruption and recommends solutions in order to remove the related 
obstacles for foreign investors. 
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2.2.4 Corruption 
The proper functioning of EU regulations on the Turkish legal environment for the 
foreign investors hugely relies upon the back tracking of the corruption. As Lou explains, 
“corruption is a behaviour in any institutions that violates formally defined role obligations in 
search of private gains” (Lou, 2002, p.113). Such role obligations may be defined in national 
level codes, governmental regulations, and organizational level ethic codes for subunits or 
individual employee. Putting the EU acquis on the rule of books is meaningless if it is not 
properly enforced because of the widespread corruption.  
The Global Competition Report of the World Economic Forum places Turkey at 35th 
position among 59 countries in the overall propensity for illegal payments for carrying out 
business activities (DEIK, 2001). Similarly, in the 2001 Corruption Perception Index by 
Transparency International; Turkey was ranked 54th country out of 91, together with Egypt 
and El Salvador behind to its competitors like Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Brazil, and 
Mexico (Lou, 2002). 
The main places where corruption is thought to be severely spread are: customs, public 
procurement, public banks, as well as the other areas such as taxation, the municipalities, the 
courts, and the implementation of incentive schemes. The main effects of corruption can be 
summarized as follows; 
 Lower efficiency in the public sector 
 Increase in public expenditures 
 Reduced government credibility 
 Barrier to competition 
 Increase of the country risk (Senatalar B. 2002, p.66) 
 
For the foreign investors, a growing economy needs a bureaucracy that enforces laws 
and regulations in a way that allows market to work. As Turkey still seems backward in 
corruption index despite of the EU process, several solutions can be projected. Gross and 
Steinherr (2004) provide a simple model of the extent of autonomy in decision-making 
bureaucrats that is consistent with minimizing corruption and the social objective of 
efficiency. The model suggests that better education and better pay for civil servants are the 
keys to success. Better educated officials can be given more leeway to interpret decisions 
because they are also less likely to use discretion for their own personal advantage as their 
prospects outside the public sector would also be tarnished by corruption. 
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Experiences from Corporate Life 
The interviews held by Mr. Husnu Dincsoy, PricewaterhouseCoopers Turkey - 
Advisory Partner, has shown that the potential foreign investors mostly complain on the lack 
of transparency of the financial statements in Turkey. Thus, even though the International 
Financial and Accounting Standards (IFRS) are embedded to the legislation in 2003, the 
implementation process should accelerate. Moreover, the new Commercial Code foresees that 
every enterprise must be audited by an international accounting firm, starting from 
01.01.2007. ‘These developments will clearly attract the attention of foreign investors’ Mr. 
Dincsoy says.  The unregistered economy which paves the way to unfair competition and the 
extending periods to take work permit are the other issues that foreign investors criticize. Mr. 
Dincsoy, who has international experience as an advisor to privatization projects, gives the 
example of Ireland, which is well known as being supportive for foreign investors in every 
sense. By establishing Irish Development Agency, Ireland has overcome most of the 
bureaucratic difficulties in attracting FDI. Lack of intellectual property rights and lack of 
qualified labor force are the other criticized issues. In order to contribute to the self financing 
foreign investors, tax incentives could be offered. Our conversation ends by giving the Russia 
example, where foreign investors earn high profits, but tend to exit from the market because 
of economic and political corruption.  
 
2.2.5 Privatization  
Privatization is analyzed under a separate section throughout the study as it has 
become one of the most important determinants of FDI in Turkey starting from 2004. 
Accordingly with the IMF Stabilization Program, Turkey has accelerated the sales of its state 
enterprises which has attracted an important amount of FDI. Moreover, Turkey foresees to 
continue with this massive privatization as of 2006. For 2006, Turkish Privatization 
Administration includes TEDAS (Turkish Electricity Distribution Inc.), Turkish Airlines and 
state owned banks such as Vakıfbank and Ziraat Bank to its privatization portfolio.  
Since the start of globalization in the world economy, privatization has taken its place 
in many countries’ economic strategy agenda. The success of some emerging markets 
attracting large amount of FDI inflows has been influenced by their privatization programs in 
this period. For most of the Central and East European region, the FDI has been closely tied 
with privatization, with the sales of state assets to multinational companies 
(http://www.undp.org.tr, 2002). 
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In Turkey, since the beginning of sales assets to the multinational companies in 1985, 
the privatization is mostly seen as a tool to increase government revenues rather than a 
structural change, and therefore the impacts of this process was limited in short term. 
Furthermore, since the acceleration of the privatization process in 2004, Turkey is criticized 
for selling its strategic assets to the foreign investors. This argument can be disproved in 
several ways. First of all, a transparent privatization process would be a good sign for foreign 
investors to invest in Turkey. Secondly, if Turkey has accepted to implement the free market 
system, then it has to fulfill its obligations. The government should pull itself off from the 
economy and should act as a controller as it is the regular case in a free market. However we 
defend that government shall continue to remain effective in health, education services and 
judicial system.   
A total of 91 M&As took place in Turkey in 2004, in 67 of which the transaction value 
was disclosed to amount to a total of $2.5 billion. This demonstrates an 82% increase over the 
2003 level, which was US$1.4 billion -excluding the Aria-Aycell merger, whose transaction 
value was not publicly revealed (PricewaterhouseCoopers, M&A Research, 2005). The most 
important transaction among the 2004 M&As was the privatization of the vehicle inspection 
station services at $613.5 million, where the servicing rights were sold to the Akfen-Dogus-
Tuvsud consortium by the Privatization Administration. Another important transaction during 
2004 was the acquisition of the indirect ownership of the financial holding company of Turk 
Ekonomi Bankasi (TEB), TEB Mali Yatirimlar, by BNP Paribas for $217 million. 
In 2004, the top 10 M&A transactions, which accounted for 75% of the total disclosed 
transaction value, indicated that energy, tourism and mining were at the top of foreign 
investors' agendas. While 2004 was a year in which foreign investors preferred to wait and see 
for the developments regarding the outcome and the sustainability of structural reforms 
promised by the government, 2005 has proved almost revolutionary in M&A activities.  
Oger Telecom of Saudi Arabia bought 55% of Turk Telekom for $6.65 billion; Koc 
Financial Services paid US$ 2.6 billion for a 57.42% equity stake in the fifth largest retail 
bank in Turkey, Yapi Kredi; and Fortis Bank of Belgium acquired 89.34% of Disbank shares 
for $1.14 billion. Another big deal in 2005 was between Sekerbank and Dutch Radobank, 
where Radobank paid $92 million for 36.5% ownership in Sekerbank. In September 2005, 
Koc Holding A.S & Shell Co. paid US$ 4.14 billion to TUPRAS  In October 2005, the 
country’s biggest state owned producer of flat steel, Eregli Iron&Steel Works Co., has sold to 
OYAK with a bid of US$ 2.77 billion. It is recently publicly announced that OYAK has 
established partnership with French Arcelor, in order to run Erdemir. In December 2005, the  
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third biggest GSM company, Telsim, is sold to British Vodafone Group Plc. with a bid of 
US$ 4.55. The following chart summarizes the 2005 privatization projects in Turkey. 
  
 
        2005 Sales Agreements 
Company mn USD 
Turk Telekom 6.550 
Telsim 4.550 
Galataport 4.300 
Tupras 4.140 
Ataturk Airport 3.000 
Erdemir 2.770 
Vakıfbank Arz 1.270 
Mersin Port 755 
Uzan Cement Factories 944.5 
Vehicle Inspection Stations 613.5 
Star TV 306.5 
Source: Turkish Privatization Administration  
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And the chart below which is based on Turkish Privatization Administration data, 
empirically indicates the fluctuations in privatization policies since 1980s and shows the 
increasing privatization in Turkey as of 2005. 
          
                                  Privatization Figures for Turkey  
Years mn USD 
1985-88 28.6 
1989 131.2 
1990 486 
1991 243.8 
1992 422.9 
1993 565.5 
1994 411.8 
1995 514.6 
1996 292 
1997 465.5 
1998 1019.7 
1999 38.3 
2000 2716.5 
2001 119.8 
2002 536.5 
2003 177 
2004 1267.2 
2005 16900.3 
                Source: Turkish Privatization Administration                     
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2.2.6 Tax System and Inflation Accounting 
Tax system is one of the determinants of FDI that is related to policy framework of the 
host country. Throughout the last decade, Turkey has applied some fiscal incentives in order 
to reduce tax burden for foreign investors. However, the main problem regarding tax system 
in Turkey has been the practice of taxing paper profits that result solely from inflation, rather 
than reflecting any realizable economic gain (ACIEP, 2003). High inflation throughout the 
last two decades and waiting to apply inflation accounting system until the beginning of 2004  
have resulted inflationary profits on tax base and corporate taxes have been paid without 
excluding inflationary profits.  
In their last report, Tusiad & Yased (2004) reported that taxes are high in Turkey 
compared to the other emerging markets. Because Turkey has recently realized how important 
taxes and incentives are for foreign firms; following amendments in tax laws have been 
enacted; 
 Inflation accounting is introduced 
 Payments and collections for a particular amount of money are done through bank 
transfers to eliminate the unrecorded economy 
The fund levy, which was 10% on the corporate tax and dividend withholding tax, has been 
eliminated. 
Similar to Tusiad & Yased report, the research conducted by Deik (2001) stresses that 
in practice; Turkey has become the country with the highest level of corporate taxes among 
emerging markets. The corporate tax rate on profits is standing at 33-35%. In November 
2005, it is publicly announced by the Turkish Ministry of Economics that the Corporate Tax 
rates are going to be lowered to 20% in 2006 which may create further incentives for foreign 
investors (Hurriyet, Nov 30, 2005). 
Volatility of the tax environment and unstable tax system are the other weak points as 
those two-volatility and instability- have been the major obstacles in creating attractive 
business environment. The chart below compares Turkey’s tax rate status with the CEEs as of 
2002. 
                                             COMPARATIVE TAX RATES (%) 
 Czech 
Republic 
Hungary  Poland  Ireland Turkey 
Corporate 
Taxes 
  31   18   28 10/12.5/20/25   33 
Local Tax    -    2   - -   - 
VAT    22    25   22    20    18 
Source:PricewaterhouseCoopers,WorldwideSummaries,CorporateTaxes,2002 
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2.2.7 Concluding Remarks 
The main determinants of the FDI inflow and the major impediments that prevent 
potential FDI inflows into Turkey were discussed in this chapter. Findings of research show 
that Turkey had failed to provide two main determinants of FDI throughout the last decade; 
the first one is policy framework (i.e. performance of the economy, political stability, 
privatization strategy, tax policy) and the second; business facilitation (i.e. administrative 
procedures, corruption). Our research shows that there have been improvement in the 
impediments of FDI since 2003, thanks to the IMF backed stabilization program and the 
reforms parallel with the EU process. Below you can find a chart for summary indicating the 
determinants of FDI. The biggest improvement is observed in the privatization process, which 
became an important tool to attract huge amounts of FDI. 
 
 
Determinants of FDI 
I. Policy Framework for FDI 
 Economic, politic and social 
stability 
 Rules regarding entry and 
operations 
 Standards of treatment of 
foreign affiliates  
 Functioning policies and 
structure of markets 
 International trade and 
investment agreements 
 Privatization policy 
 Trade policy and coherence of 
FDI and trade policies 
 Tax policy 
 
III. Business Facilitation 
 Investment promotion 
 Investment incentives 
 Social amenities  
 After investment services 
II. Economic Determinants 
Market Seeking  
 Market size 
 Market growth 
 Access to regional and 
global markets 
 Country specific consumer 
preferences  
 Structure of markets 
Resource Seeking 
 Raw materials 
 Low cost unskilled and 
semi-skilled labor 
Efficiency Seeking 
 Cost of resources and 
assets listed above, 
adjusted for productivity 
for labor resources  
 Other input costs; e.g. 
transport and 
communication costs 
to/from and within host 
country and costs of other 
intermediate products 
Asset Seeking 
 Build new technology and 
distribution networks 
 Physical infrastructure 
Source: World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2003) and Dunning(1993) 
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CHAPTER 3 
             Comparison of Turkey with the EU Members 
 
The second chapter has analyzed the main determinants and impediments to FDI in 
Turkey. The analysis shows that there has been improvement in the investment climate 
through last two years due to the IMF backed stabilization program and the improving 
relations with the EU. At this point it would be beneficial to make comparison of the certain 
economic determinants of Turkey with the EU members & candidates. The following 
comparison aims to provide the readers an insight about the impacts of membership or 
candidate status on FDI inflows, the status of key competitors of Turkey in attracting FDI and 
the areas that Turkey needs to improve to attract sustainable FDI inflow. The comparative 
analysis will include key factors such as purchasing power parity, labor costs, labor 
productivity, education, trade openness and demographic dynamics.  
Although they have a different economic background from Turkey, the CEEs 
represent fierce competition for Turkey in attracting FDI, the main competitors being Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. For the 1998–2003 periods, net inflows of FDI amounted to 
less than one percent of GDP in Turkey while they reached six percent for Bulgaria, three 
percent for Romania and 4.3 percent for the group formed by Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Poland.  
FDI in Turkey and CEEs 2001-2004, mn USD 
         
2001 
       
2002 
        
2003 
          
    2004 
          FDI(% of GDP)* 
Turkey 3,268 1,063 1,753 2,733 2.3 % 
Czech Republic 5,641 6,483 2,901 4,483 8.6 % 
Hungary 3,938 2,964 2,182 4,167 4.7 % 
Poland 5,714 4,131 4,123 6,159 3.1 % 
     Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2005 
 
  
 As it is seen from the figure above, Turkey has been less successful in attracting FDI  
relative to its size of economy and population. The key reasons of low FDI inflow are 
discussed in the previous chapter and this chapter will give the readers an insight about the 
status of key determinants in Turkey and the recent EU members & candidates.                                          
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3.1 Growth & Purchasing Power Parity  
As discussed in the second chapter, performance of the economy is one of the most 
important economic determinants for the FDI inflow (Loewendhal, 2001). Certainly, the 
growth rates stand as the crucial indicator for the performance of the economy. The below 
figure summarizes the growth rates in the last decade and compares the performances of 
Poland, Portugal and Turkey. Thus, when compared to its competitors, Turkey has 
experienced volatile growth rates which had been a negative sign for the foreign investors. 
When analyzing Poland, one can observe that since the start of accession negotiations in 
1998, the growth rates show an increasing tendency.  Thus, it may be an important indicator 
for Turkey that the official start of accession negotiations in October 2005 may be a positive 
sign for the future growth rates. 
 
 To give a broader insight to the readers, we will provide a comparison of purchasing 
power parity between Turkey and the new EU entrants below.  The below research indicates 
that in 2003, Turkey’s nominal capita per income is at 12 % of the 2003 EU -15 average and 
at 25% of PPP adjusted per capita income of the EU-15 (Oztrak, 2004).  Another useful 
dimension of PPP comparison is that Turkey’s domestic market size is usually discussed as 
one of the attractive reasons to have direct investment in Turkey. In his research, Bosut (1999) 
describes Turkey as a large and growing domestic market for the foreign investors. Its 
proximity to the emerging markets in the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as its cultural 
ties with certain countries, creates lucrative business opportunities. However, as the 
purchasing power of the people is low compared to the EU-15 and the recent EU entrants, the 
‘big domestic market’ argument will totally be ineffective.  
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Turning to individual comparisons and including Romania and Bulgaria which are 
listed for accession to the EU in 2007, Turkey’s nominal per capita income in 2003 was about 
62 % that of Poland but was actually 29 % higher than Romania’s and 33 % higher than 
Bulgaria’s. When we consider that these comparisons take place at the time of their accession 
and Turkey is considered about a decade before the accession, we can easily conclude that if 
Turkey continues with its current growth rate, the numbers and the results of the analysis can 
change rapidly. However, for today, we may conclude that the argument of big domestic 
market for the foreign investors is not a genuine one as the purchasing power of people in 
Turkey is even less than that of the future members, i.e. Romania and Bulgaria.  
3.2 Labor Costs & Productivity & Education 
The labor issue (i.e. labor costs, productivity and skilled labor) is another important 
determinant in attracting FDI. In the below research of Loewendhal (2001);  Turkey has an 
employment cost around $ 7.958  per labor, while Czech Republic and Poland stand highly 
competitive compared to Turkey. This huge cost difference arises because of high tax burden 
on wages and salaries in Turkey. Thus, labor costs tend to stand as an important impediment 
in front of foreign investors in Turkey compared to the new EU entrants; until the burden of 
foreign investors regarding legal deductions on salaries and wages are reduced. 
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 Despite of the above facts on labor costs, labor productivity is equally important for 
the foreign investors in a host country. The most recent comparative research on the issue is 
completed in 2000 which is summarized below. The table; ‘Sectoral Gross Value Added per 
person Employed’ shows that Turkish labor productivity is close to that of Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. Thus, productivity in services, construction, and even in industry is high 
in Turkey when compared to the new entrants of the EU. The situation looks even more 
favourable to Turkish industry when productivity levels are compared to Romania and 
Bulgaria; the two remaining candidate countries beside Turkey. The comparisons show that 
Turkish economy is not only more developed in terms of productivity than the economies of 
Romania and Bulgaria but that Turkish productivity outside agriculture is close to or higher 
than what we observe in the new EU entrants (Oztrak, 2004). The high productivity levels 
might even improve with the demographic trend and be a source for more rapid income 
growth through the accession negotiation process. Thus, if we combine our analysis with the 
above findings; we can conclude that the labor costs are high in Turkey compared to that of 
new EU entrants; however Turkey is prevailing in labor productivity, which is a significant 
positive indication for the foreign investors.  
   Sectoral Gross Value Per Person Employed(Euros) 
 
   Source: Eurostat, (cited by Oztrak, Relative Income Growth and Convergence, 2004) 
 
The general overview is that Turkey has a relatively skilled labor force which puts it in 
a competitive position among the other emerging markets.  Dervis (2004) discusses that in 
terms of investing on human capital, Turkey starts from a very weak point. From the figures 
below, it is apparent that Turkey is investing relatively little in education, with the exception 
of Greece, which is taken into the comparison because of the proximity fact. The two new  
 
Labor Costs in Manufacturing,1991-95 
(US$) 
Country Labor Costs 
Turkey 7.958 
Hungary 2.777 
Czech Republic 1.876 
Poland 1.714 
Greece  15.899 
Ireland 25.414 
Romania 1.190 
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member countries Poland and Hungary seem to invest more in education, i.e. almost 1.5 times 
more than Turkey. When we look at the percentage of adult population with upper secondary 
education, only Portugal is performing worse than Turkey. It is not surprising though, as 
Portugal is currently facing with a hard time in competition through the internal market after 
the enlargement.  
  
Total expenditure on % of adult population with 
  
education as % of GDP upper secondary education 
Turkey 
 3. 91 24.3 
Poland 5.31 45.9 
Portugal 5.69 19.8 
Greece 3. 86 51.4 
Hungary 5.15 70.2 
                 Source: OECD (cited by Dervis, Stabilizing Stabilization, 2004) 
 
 Even though Turkey has spent relatively low to the education so far, the 2006 Budget 
is promising. Accordingly; the share of expenditure on education will be 9.5 % of the GDP as 
of 2006 which might be a positive indicator for the foreign investors. However, today’s facts 
indicate that Turkey lags behind its competitors in investing human capital.    
3.3 Trade Openness 
The trade openness is another crucial issue that foreign investors evaluate in a country. 
The openness of trade would encourage foreign investors to establish an export base in the 
host country. Moreover, greater openness brings fiercer competition which paves the way to 
higher quality.  Until 1980, Turkey was a closed economy. Exports accounted for 5 % of GDP 
much less than Franco’s Spain of the time (Gros, Oztrak 2004). The reforms of 1980 included 
the abolition of subsidies and price controls, more flexible exchange and interest rates. As it is 
analyzed form the graph below, Turkey’s export amounts gradually increased to 30% of GDP 
as of 2004. The most important reason for this increase is the Customs Union Agreement 
going into effect in 1996. Under the Customs Union Agreement both import and export 
regimes have been made consistent with the EU regulations (http://www.seeurope.net, 2005). 
Thus, Turkey has already adopted a considerable amount of relevant Community legislation. 
Today’s export figures are even close to Spain, which has been part of the internal market for 
more than 10 years. Spain is taken as an example because of its similarity in trade openness 
with Turkey. Spain was very closed in 1980 it was ranked among 17th among 21 OECD 
Countries (Deutschebank Research Report, 2003). Its accession to the EU in 1986 triggered a 
wave of trade liberalization.  Since 1980, despite of the improvement in the trade openness of 
Turkey, exports to the EU account for 15 % of GDP compared to 20% in Poland, which is the 
least open country among the new entrants. 
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The Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and EU eliminates all customs duties 
and equivalent charges to industrial imports from the EU, as well as all quantitative 
restrictions. However according to a research conducted by INRA (Institute National pour la 
Recherche Agricole) for the European Commission in 2003, EU is one of the worlds most 
open market to imports of agricultural products from third countries and especially from 
developing ones. Thus, if the parties could extent the scope of the agreement to the 
agricultural products, Turkey’s trade openness degree would further improve compared to the 
current EU members. “While Germany,  Belgium and Netherlands were among the most open 
countries in 2005, we expect that emerging markets like Korea, China and Turkey will have 
overtaken them by 2020” (Neuhaus, Deutchebank Research, 2003, p.1). 
 
Source: Eurostat (cited by Daniel Gros, Economic Aspects of Turkey’s  Membership, 2005) 
 
 
3.4 Demographic Dynamics 
Last, but not least, FDI inflow is parallel with the demographic dynamics in the host 
country. The investors would like to obtain the necessary labor force for the production in the 
host country rather than bringing blue collar workers from abroad. Moreover, with their 
different recruiting processes from the local companies, the MNEs usually try to choose most 
of its white collar employees from the host country. In contrast to its competitors, namely EU 
members, Turkey’s population is still growing but the rate of increase has slowed 
considerably compared to last decades. According to the ministry of national education, the 
population increase ratio has begun to fall. However currently, 37.3 million people are still  
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making up 57% of the population belong to 0-24 age group (http://www.meb.gov.tr, 2002).  
The figure below compares Turkey’s demographic dynamics with the ‘old Europe’ (Gros, 
2004).  From the figure we can analyze that old Europe has been stagnating or growing rather 
slowly for the last several decades. On the other hand, Turkish population has doubled during 
the same time.                                                                                                                                                        
Projections indicate that Turkey’s population growth rate will be moderate in 
forthcoming 25 years, however compared to Italy and Germany; Turkey remains much more 
dynamic than other member countries. The Turkish population in working age has grown 
rapidly in last decade, which is a clear source of labor force for the forthcoming FDI. If 
Turkey can increase its employment level as well, it will have a clearly strong advantage over 
the richest members of the EU in the demographic area. 
 
Source: US Census Bureau  (cited by Daniel Gros, Economic Aspects of Turkey’s  Membership, 2005) 
  
 
In order to provide a comprehensive comparison; there exists a detailed 
competitiveness ranking between EU Members and candidates below. The research, which is 
presented at World Economic Forum in 2003, indicates that Turkey is performing far better in 
the key areas than the future members in 2007, namely Romania and Bulgaria. However, 
compared to the recent EU entrants, Turkey has to improve on several issues such as Research 
& Development (R&D), financial services and sustainable development. Although the 
average share of R&D in GDP increased from 0.4% in 1994 to 0.6% during 1998-2000 --
considering the average between 2.5 % - 3 % in developed countries (Tusaid & Yased, 2004) 
--, it is not a sufficient share to boost innovation in the country. It is advised in the OECD  
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Economic Surveys that “if Turkey wishes to upgrade its production base and move toward a 
more high-tech economy, both business and government need to invest in R&D, develop new 
products and gain access to technologies being developed abroad.” (OECD, 2001, p.32). 
Implementation of tax incentives to the techno parks and corporate tax postponement for 
R&D would help to betterment of the conditions. The improvement of financial services in 
Turkey is observed since 2003, which is proved by the increasing foreign investors in the 
sector. Currently 15 % of the financial services sector is dominated by the foreign investors, 
which had been below 5 % as at September 2004 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, M & A Research, 
2005). However this ratio is even less than that of Czech Republic and Bulgaria; where the 
foreign investors dominate 90% of the market. 
 
 
 
                        Competitiveness Ranking for recent EU Members & Candidates 
 
Source: World Economic Forum, (cited by Oztrak, Relative Income Growth and Convergence,2004) 
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     CHAPTER 4 
                  Recommendations & Conclusion 
 
4.1 Recommendations  
Turkey has already started to take steps in enhancing quality business environment and 
improvement in foreign direct investment climate. The following recommendations will be 
helpful to achieve higher FDI levels: 
- Support for effective Information Technologies Systems and innovation shall be provided 
- Accelerated privatization should be maintained, the Privatization Administration shall 
continue its operations with its privatization portfolio  
- Increase education levels for all segments of the society 
- Current economic program shall be followed with IMF as it is a strong economic anchor 
- Business facilitation issues should be improved. Establishing a single official body to deal 
with burdensome administrative procedures would also remove corruption as well 
- Transparency should be provided in companies’ financial statements; related legal actions 
shall be taken against the companies that resist adapting international accounting standards  
- Facilitating the investment process is not sufficient by itself. Turkey has to promote its 
business climate abroad. Thus, an effective public relations organization should be established 
(i.e. a semi-autonomous Investment Promotion Agency) 
- Decisive policies should continue through the negotiation process with the EU and political 
and economic reforms must be put in practice as the European Union will stand as a strong 
political anchor in the near future  
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4.2 Concluding Remarks 
The figures show that in spite of its huge potential, Turkey is a country which lags 
behind other comparable economies in terms of FDI. This study aims to analyze the 
development and determinants of FDI in Turkey, as well as main impediments that paved way 
to the low inward investment during the last two decades. For this purpose, a comparison of 
the key determinants of FDI with the EU Members and candidates are presented.  
The analysis at the beginning of the study shows that EU Member States are the main 
source of FDI inflow in Turkey. Manufacturing industry attracts most of the FDI which is 
followed by the service sector. The target of Turkey to become a full member of the EU 
makes it a suitable location especially for the efficiency-seeking FDI. 
The political and economic instability, cumbersome bureaucracy, wide spread 
corruption, unregistered economy, failure in implementing policies such as privatization, and 
inappropriate tax system have been the main obstacles to create favourable investment climate 
for foreign investors. Among with the impediments, the betterment of the conditions are also 
explained in detail. The Turkish economy has become more robust and flexible to shocks as a 
result of the reforms introduced under IMF backed economic programmes since 2001.  
Furthermore, Turkey has made a major advance by achieving the Copenhagen political 
criteria which were so problematic to implement in previous years and was given October 
2005 as a date to start the EU accession negotiations. This is seen as a strong signal for 
foreign investors of the stabilization of Turkey. With the introduction of the new FDI law in 
2003 and policy regulations, a more favorable investment climate is achieved, purified from 
lengthy administrative procedures. The announcement of a significant decrease in corporate 
tax rates as of 2005 indicates that importance of the foreign capital is realized by Turkish 
politicians.   
Our analytic comparison with the EU members & candidates indicate that Turkey is 
disadvantageous on some key determinants of FDI inflow such as labor costs, education and 
purchasing power parity. However the determinants are improving rapidly such as trade 
openness. Moreover, converting the determinants to one’s advantage relies on Turkey’s 
performance as it is the case with the demographic dynamism. The Competitiveness Ranking 
of the World Economic Forum shows that Turkey is performing far better than the future EU 
members, Romania and Bulgaria, but needs to take decisive steps to catch recent EU entrants 
to become competitive in attracting FDI. 
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Our recommendations point out that; it is now time to accelerate the pace of 
privatization in strategic sectors as this would reduce the political interference in business and 
therefore stimulate foreign investors’ interest in the Turkish market. However as with the  
privatizations of Turk Telecom and Tupras, protests by employees and legal challenges may 
cause delays to the government’s ambitious privatization projects. 
As it has been the case in Central and Eastern European Countries recently, it is 
widely accepted that the foreign investors foresee the prospect of future EU membership as a  
guarantee and tool for stability. To give an example, the Eurostat Report in 1997 (cited by 
TUSIAD,2004) shows that FDI inflows in Ireland are doubled in the first five years following 
the accession and also in Portugal, FDI doubled each year at the period between 1987-1989; 
just one year after becoming full member. Spain’s figures also show similar increase in FDI 
inflows after membership (Loewendahl&Ertugal, 2001). However the prospect of its future 
membership could reinforce the FDI potential of Turkey only on the condition that it follows 
its commitment to carry out economic and democratic reforms in order to achieve sustained 
stability.  
Combining the two main chapters and analysis, the result of the study indicates that 
even though the FDI has enormously increased in 2004 and 2005, the increase is mostly due 
to the immense privatization program followed by the current government and improvement 
of the relations with the European Union. However unlike the other enlargements, EU 
accession negotiations with Turkey are an open-ended and not guaranteed beforehand. 
Moreover, the possibility of permanent safeguard clauses for the movements of Turkish 
people could imply a second-class membership for Turkey and can be considered as 
unacceptable in the future. Finally, France and Austria has announced that they would like to 
consult their citizens’ opinion on Turkish membership by referendum. Thus, the process of 
negotiating Turkey's membership is long and unsteady.  In our opinion, Turkey shall not link 
its future FDI inflow projections to its relations with the European Union. Instead; Turkey 
should try to close the gaps between herself and the current EU Members to achieve a 
sustainable FDI inflow throughout the next decade. 
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